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Abstract
Preventing waste generation is the rst priority of waste management policies in many
countries. In this paper, we examine the eect of unit-based pricing policy using a causal
inference approach. Although previous research has examined the impact of unit-based
pricing, few studies implement a causal inference framework. We apply the approach
called \Weighted Fixed Eects Regression Models for Causal Inference" developed by
Imai and Kim (2016, 2019) and nd that the eect of unit-based pricing is overestimated
by standard linear xed eects models. We also nd evidence that the eect of unit-based
pricing is not strictly increasing in the price of waste collection.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The substantial increase in the amount of municipal solid waste (MSW) is one of the most
severe environmental issues in the world. Kaza et al. (2019) shows that, in 2016, approx-
imately 2.01 billion tons of MSW was generated throughout the world, and the amount is
projected to increase to 3.40 billion tons by 2050. Rapid growth of the amount of waste not
only deteriorates environmental quality or our health but also worsens the nancial condition
of municipalities who have responsibility for disposing MSW. In fact, a substantial amount
of taxes are used for waste disposal every year, and this situation reduces municipalities'
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resources for other important services, such as education, welfare services, and employment
measures.1
An extensive number of municipalities in many areas of the world have introduced a unit-
based pricing system that requires residents to pay a fee for waste collection to address the
problem of the increasing MSW. This pricing system has become one of the most widespread
policies for MSW reduction, and several empirical studies have been conducted to assess the
eectiveness. However, assessment of the causal eect of unit-based pricing faces several
problems, such as omitted variables, similar to prior research on the eects of other policies.
In this study, we apply the weighted xed eects approach developed by Imai and Kim
(2016, 2019) to reexamine the eect of the unit-based pricing system on waste generation.
This approach has desirable properties for assessing causal inference with panel data compared
with the typical linear xed eects model, which has been widely used in recent studies of
unit-based pricing. In particular, in contrast to the standard linear xed eects model, this
approach can consistently estimate the causal eect even if the data comprise records of
more than two periods; additionally, the method does not require the assumption of linearity.
Moreover, the denition of the counterfactual outcome, the key factor for conducting causal
inference, in the weighted xed eects model is intuitively easier to understand than that in
the linear xed eects model (Imai and Kim (2019 )).
This study also relaxes the implicit assumption that the waste reduction eect of unit-
based pricing strictly increases as the price of waste collection increases. This assumption has
been used by most studies on unit-based pricing. Although plausible, this assumption is not
always true. For instance, unit-based pricing may have no eect on waste reduction when the
1See Kaza et al. (2019) for details.
2
price per unit of waste collection is relatively low, while pricing may have signicant eect
when the price per unit is suciently high. In this scenario, the eect of unit-based pricing
is no longer strictly increasing as the price of the waste collection increases. We relax this
assumption by applying several types of treatment groups depending on the level of the price
introduced by the unit-based pricing policy.
Our analysis is based on panel data provided by the Japanese Ministry of the Environment
that include longitudinal and precise data on MSW at the municipality level in Japan. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study that examines the eect of unit-based pricing
policy by applying a causal inference approach that is specically designed for panel data
and conducts causal inference on the eect of unit pricing policy by allowing for nonlinearity
and a nonstrictly increasing relation between the eect of unit-based pricing and the price of
waste collection imposed by the policy.
1.2 Literature review
Major progress has been made in the study of unit-based pricing since the late 1970s. Wertz
(1976) conducted one of the pioneering studies in this eld. He focused on San Francisco's
unit-based pricing policy and estimated the price elasticity of garbage collection as -0.15.
Although many subsequent studies have been published, such as Ferrara and Missios (2005),
estimation bias induced by the omitted variable problem remains one of the most considerable
issues to address.
To address this issue, some studies, such as Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) and Huang
et al. (2011), have applied instrumental variable methods. Another approach is to construct
panel data and to use the linear xed eects model to capture unobserved time-invariant
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characteristics. For example, Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004, 2009) examined the eect of unit-
based pricing policy by applying the linear xed eects model to province-level panel data.
Allers and Hoeben (2010) introduced the dierence-in-dierences approach to analyze unit-
based pricing and examined its eect using a two-way linear xed eects model that includes
both unit xed eects and time xed eects. Usui and Takeuchi (2014) applied the two-
way linear xed eects model, focusing on the long-run eect of unit-based pricing. The
linear xed eects model is widely used to estimate the causal eect of policy interventions;
however, the model cannot properly estimate the causal eect if the data are from more than
two periods2. As most panel data analyses conducted in this eld are based on multiperiod
data, the results of previous studies unavoidably contain some bias. Moreover, this approach
crucially depends on the linearity assumption, which is dicult to justify.
Other methods can be used to address the issue of unobserved variables. Valente and
Bueno (2019) analyzed the introduction of unit-based pricing in Trento, Italy and applied
a synthetic control method that accounts for time-varying eects of unobserved character-
istics. In a sense, Valente and Bueno (2019) and our study both aim to improve ordinary
xed eects models. However, the former focused on capturing the time-varying eects of
unobserved characteristics, whereas our research focuses on relaxing the linearity assumption
and considering the proper denition of the counterfactual outcome.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the status of MSW
disposal in Japan, and section 3 explains the data. In section 4, we describe the economet-
ric model. Then, section 5 presents the estimation results. Finally, section 6 provides our
conclusions and suggestions for future research.
2See Imai and Kim (2016,2019) for details.
4
2 MSW Disposal in Japan
In Japan, waste management is controlled by the Waste Management and Public Cleansing
Act. According to the Act, waste is roughly categorized into two kinds, general waste and
industrial waste, depending upon who generates the waste and the type of waste. The Act
denes industrial waste as the twenty types of waste discharged from specic business ac-
tivities and general waste as waste that is not industrial waste. Moreover, general waste is
divided into household waste and business waste. Because the goal of the unit-based pricing
policy in Japan is reduction of household waste, we focus on household waste.
Each of the more than 1,700 municipalities in Japan is responsible for proper treatment of
the household waste generated within its jurisdiction. The only exception is recycling, which
is governed by a series of acts from the 2000s that cover six types of waste (automobiles,
home appliances, containers and packaging, food waste, construction waste, and small electric
products). For example, if a resident of a municipality stops using a car, the manufacturer,
not the municipality, is responsible for its proper disposal.
Although the central government (the Japanese Ministry of the Environment) provides
some subsidies, especially when a municipality builds a facility such as an incinerator, most
of the waste management policies (with the exception of the above) are determined by each
municipality independently. Therefore, a wide range of policies exist among municipalities.
////// Insert Figure 1 around here //////
Figure 1 shows histograms of the yearly waste generation per capita among municipalities
in 2015, including information on unit-based pricing. One might assume that changing the
relative price of waste disposal aects household behavior; however, the introduction of unit-
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based pricing does not appear to aect either waste generation or the recycling rate. Should
we conclude that there is no response to unit pricing in Japan? Figure 1 provides a snapshot
of waste generation. To answer this question, we must investigate the changes in waste
generation in each municipality over time, which requires a panel data set and proper handling
of the timing of policy intervention.
3 Data
Since 1998, the Japanese Ministry of the Environment has provided a database on MSW at the
municipality level called the \State of Discharge and Treatment of Municipal Solid Waste".
We can use this database to develop municipality-level panel data on MSW for approximately
20 years. However, in Japan, a boom of municipal mergers occurred from the mid-1990s to
mid-2000s. Such municipal mergers cause an attrition problem that weakens the reliability of
panel data analysis. Thus, we restrict our focus to data from 2005 to 2015, when the number
of municipal mergers is relatively low.3 Figure 2 shows the number of municipalities listed for
each year in the State of Discharge and Treatment of Municipal Solid Waste database4. In
this analysis, we exclude data from municipalities that experienced mergers during 2005{2015.
////// Insert Figure 2 around here //////
Although the categories of MSW dier among Japanese municipalities, the category of
burnable waste is used most widely. In addition, the amount of discharged burnable waste is
the largest among the categories of MSW. For instance, according to the State of Discharge
and Treatment of Municipal Solid Waste, in 2015, the total amount of burnable waste for
3The year 2015 is the latest year for which data are available at the time of writing this paper.
4http://www.env.go.jp/recycle/waste tech/ippan/index.html
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all municipalities was 19,730,444 tons; that of mixed waste, the second largest category, was
1,719,203 tons; and that of unburnable waste, the third largest category, was 1,027,363 tons.
Therefore, in this analysis, we select the amount of burnable waste per person per year as
the outcome variable and use unit-based pricing for burnable waste as the treatment variable.
Moreover, we omit municipalities that do not include burnable waste as a category.
The data on unit-based pricing are taken from Yamaya (2018) because the State of Dis-
charge and Treatment of Municipal Solid Waste database does not provide such information.
However, Yamaya (2018) presented precise data on unit-based pricing, including the year
when the municipalities started the unit-based pricing system, only for cities5. Therefore, we
restrict our focus to cities and develop a city-level panel dataset covering the years from 2005
to 2015.
The unit-based pricing system in Japan takes several forms. Two primary types of fee
systems exist: (1) fees based on the amount of discharged MSW and (2) fees for the amount
of waste exceeding a specied amount that can be discharged with no fee. In the former case,
residents have to pay for garbage bags designed by the municipality or purchase a sticker
that must be attached to the garbage bag. In the latter case, residents can discharge a given
amount of waste for free: if they want to discharge more than the allowed amount, they are
required to pay for the additional garbage bag, similar to the previous case. Since only a
small number of cities apply the latter system, we focus on the former. In fact, the former
type is used by 442 cities, while the latter is used by 25 cities6. In addition, although three
sizes of garbage bags|small, medium, and large|are used, we consider only the price per
5To the best of our knowledge, Yamaya (2018) is the only study to collect data on unit-based pricing on a
national level in Japan.
6See Yamaya (2018) for details.
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large-sized bag, in line with Usui and Takeuchi (2014).
To estimate the eect of unit-based pricing on residents' recycling activity, we also use
six types of recyclable waste as outcome variables: paper, metal, glass, polyethylene tereph-
thalate bottles (PET bottles), plastic, and cloth. These data are obtained from the State of
Discharge and Treatment of Municipal Solid Waste database. In the analysis, we calculate
the percentage of discharged waste accounted for by each recyclable.
For the time-varying confounders, we include ve variables: per capita income (inc),
population density (dens), ratio of persons aged 65 years or over (old), average number of
persons per family (family), and cultivated acreage per person (culti). These variables are
used widely in previous studies on unit-based pricing. In addition, to capture the type of
MSW collection in each city, we develop a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the city
adopts a door-to-door collection system and 0 otherwise (collec). We compile the data on
the collection system of each city from the State of Discharge and Treatment of Municipal
Solid Waste database. Data on population and the number of persons aged 65 years or over
are from the Basic Resident Register System of Japan7, and the remaining data are from the
Regional Statistics Database provided by Japanese Government Statistics8.
////// Insert Table 1 around here //////
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for all variables used in the econometric analysis.
In estimating the eect of unit-based pricing on the amount of burnable waste, we use the
7To equalize the date when the data were collected as much as possible, we take a one-year lead for
population density, ratio of persons aged 65 years or over, and number of persons per family in the econometric
analysis. In fact, family size and the population by age group are from the data as of March 31 in each year
t, while the other variables used in the analysis are from the data of each Japanese scal year t running from
April 1 in year t to March 31 in year t + 1. Thus, taking a one-year lead for family size and the population
by age group, rather than using the original data, reduces the gap between the data collection periods of the
explanatory variables.
8https://www.stat.go.jp/data/s-sugata/naiyou.html#toukei1
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natural logarithm of the outcome variable (bwaste).
4 Econometric Model
We believe economic incentives contribute to decreasing waste generation from households
when they are well-designed. Our motivation in this paper is to estimate the causal eect of
unit-based pricing on waste generation as precisely as possible. For that purpose, we introduce
a newly developed estimation method.
4.1 Weighted xed eects model
The standard two-way linear xed eects model can be written as follows:
Yit = + i + t + Xit + Zit + it; (1)
where Yit denotes the outcome variable of unit i in period t,  is a constant term, i is a unit
xed eect, t is a time xed eect, Xit is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if unit
i is treated in period t and 0 otherwise, Zit is the vector of time-variant confounders, and it
implies an error term. This model is used widely in studies on policy assessment because it
can provide the dierence-in-dierences (DiD) estimator. However, the equality of the DiD
estimator and the two-way linear xed eects estimator is valid only when the data consist
of two periods and the unit receives treatment in the second period only. However, in many
cases, panel data consist of more than two periods. In fact, according to Imai and Kim (2016),
the two-way linear xed eects estimator is equivalent to the following estimator:9
^FE  1
K
(
1
NT
NX
i
TX
t

Y^it
FE
(1)  Y^itFE(0)
)
(2)
9For details, see proposition 4 of Imai and Kim (2016).
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where N is the number of units, T is the number of periods, and for x = 0; 1
Y^it
FE
(x) =
8>>>><>>>>:
Yit if Xit = x;
1
T   1
X
t0 6=t
Yit0| {z }
(i)
+
1
N   1
X
i0 6=iYi
0t| {z }
(ii)
  1
(T   1)(N   1)
X
i0 6=i
X
t0 6=t
Yi0t0| {z }
(iii)
if Xit = 1  x:
(3)
and
K  1
NT
NX
i=1
TX
t=1

Xit
P
t0 6=t(1 Xit0)
T   1 +
P
i0 6=i(1 Xi0t)
N   1  
P
i0 6=i
P
t0 6=t(1 Xi0t0)
(T   1)(N   1)

+(1 Xit)
P
t0 6=tXit0
T   1 +
P
i0 6=iXi0t
N   1  
P
i0 6=i
P
t0 6=tXi0t0
(T   1)(N   1)

:
We interpret the denition of the counterfactual outcome shown in (3) by considering the
situation in which municipality i introduces unit-based pricing at time t. As shown in the
second line of (3), the counterfactual outcome for the treated unit i at time t calculated by
the two-way xed eects model consists of three components:
(i) the average of unit i's outcome for all periods except time t,
(ii) the average of all units' outcome at time t except unit i and
(iii) the average outcome for all units except i for all periods except t.
Thus, the counterfactual in the two-way linear xed eects model uses the data of all
the other observations except unit i at time t. This fact implies that in the two-way linear
xed eects model, not only the data of observations in the control group but also those in
the treated group may be used to calculate the counterfactual outcome for the treated unit.
Therefore, it is dicult to interpret the two-way linear xed eects estimator as representing a
causal eect of the treatment. To remedy this bias, the two-way linear xed eects model uses
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K, the proportion of properly matched observations for which the counterfactual outcome is
calculated by using the observations with the opposite treatment status. However, as shown by
Imai and Kim (2016), this adjustment is not sucient to yield a consistent average treatment
eect (ATE) estimator. In addition, the two-way linear xed eects model relies heavily on
the assumption of linearity.
Thus, in this study, we apply the weighted xed eects model developed by Imai and
Kim (2016, 2019) to estimate the causal eect of unit pricing on the amount of MSW. This
approach is superior to the two-way linear xed eects model because it can relax the linearity
assumption. In addition, a multiperiod DiD estimator can be obtained even if the data
comprise more than two periods.
Suppose we are interested in estimating a causal eect from data that contain N units
and T periods10. First, the weighted xed eects model applies three types of matched sets,
dened as follows:
MDiDit = f(i0; t0) : i0 = i; t0 = t  1; Xi0t0 = 0g; (4)
NDiDit = f(i0; t0) : i0 6= i; t0 = t;Xi0t0 = Xi0t0 1 = 0g; (5)
ADiDit = f(i0; t0) : i0 6= i; t0 = t  1; Xi0t0 = Xi0t = 0g: (6)
MDiDit refers to the set that consists of observations of unit i in the previous period if it
does not receive treatment in the present period. NDiDit consists of observations other than
those of unit i in the present period that do not receive treatment in either the previous or
present period. ADiDit is the set that consists of observations other than those of unit i in the
previous period that do not receive treatment in either the previous or present period.
10For simplicity, we omit the time-variant confounders.
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By using the denition of the three sets shown above, a multiperiod DiD estimator can
be dened as follows:
^DiD =
1PN
i=1
PT
t=1Dit
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
Dit(Y^it(1)  Y^it(0)): (7)
This estimator captures the ATE. In the above equation, Dit takes a value of 1 if unit
i in period t belongs to the treated group and both MDiDit and NDiDit contain at least one
observation and 0 otherwise:
Dit = Xit1f#MDiDit #NDiDit > 0g; (8)
where #MDiDit and #NDiDit represent the number of observations contained in MDiDit and
NDiDit , respectively. In addition, Y^it(x) is dened as follows:
Y^it(x) =
8>>>><>>>>:
Yit if x = 1;
Yit 1| {z }
(i)
+
P
(i0;t)2NDiDit Yi0t
#NDiDit| {z }
(ii)
 
P
(i0;t0)2ADiDit Yi0t0
#ADiDit| {z }
(iii)
if x = 0: (9)
The key to conducting causal inference is precise estimation of the counterfactual. How-
ever, as noted above, for panel data from more than two periods, the denition of the counter-
factual used in the normal two-way linear xed eects model lacks a reasonable explanation.
On the other hand, as shown in (9), the weighted xed eects model denes unit i's counter-
factual output in a much clearer way11.
(i) the waste of municipality i in the period just before introducing unit-based pricing,
t  1,
11The weighted xed eects model denes the unit i's counterfactual output in period t as the total of unit
i's output in one period before it receives the treatment, period t 1, and the average of the dierences between
the output in the present period and that in the previous period of all but unit i with receiving no treatment
in both periods.
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(ii) the average amount of discharged waste at time t for municipalities that do not introduce
unit-based pricing at time t and t  1 and
(iii) the average amount of waste in period t   1 for all municipalities in which unit-based
pricing is not introduced at both t  1 and t.
Imai and Kim (2016) show that, under certain conditions, the multiperiod DiD estima-
tor dened as (7) is equivalent to the following weighted two-way linear xed eects model
estimator12:
^DiD = argmin

NX
i=1
TX
t=1
Witf(Yit   Y i   Y t + Y )  (Xit   Xi   Xt + X)g2; (10)
where Xi =
PT
t=1WitXitPT
t=1Wit
; Xt =
PN
n=1WitXitPN
n=1Wit
; X =
PN
n=1
PT
t=1WitXitPN
n=1
PT
t=1Wit
; Y i =
PT
t=1WitYitPT
t=1Wit
;
Y t =
PN
n=1WitYitPT
n=1Wit
; Y  =
PN
n=1
PT
t=1WitYitPN
n=1
PT
t=1Wit
; and the weight, Wit, is dened as follows:
Wit =
NX
i0=1
TX
t0=1
Di0t0w
i0t0
it =
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
1 if (i; t) = (i0; t0);
1
#MDiDi0t0
if (i; t) 2MDiDi0t0 ;
1
#NDiDi0t0
if (i; t) 2 NDiDi0t0 ;
(2Xit   1)(2Xi0t0   1)
#ADiDit
if (i; t) 2 ADiDi0t0 and
0 otherwise:
In this study, we use (10) to estimate the eect of unit pricing on MSW discharge13. Thus,
we eliminate any bias caused by misspecication of the linear assumption and the mixture of
the treatment status in the case of more than two periods.
12See Theorem 2 in Imai and Kim (2016) for details.
13The actual estimation was done using the wfe package in R. For more information, please see https://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/wfe/index.html
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4.2 Treatment variable
As shown in Table 1, the price of garbage bags diers among municipalities. To equalize
the treatment status of observations in the treatment group as much as possible, we classify
treatment groups into several types based on the price of garbage bags. In particular, we
dene the treatment variable as shown in Table 2.
////// Insert Table 2 around here //////
For example, under the denition of X1, cities where the price of a municipality-designed
garbage bag for burnable waste is set as more than 0 yen but less than or equal to 10 yen
are dened as the treated group.14 The other cities, excluding those that set the garbage bag
price as more than 10 yen, are dened as the control group. Since only six cities set the price
of a garbage bag strictly higher than 80 yen, we do not set an upper limit for X8 and X
0
4. In
contrast to standard estimation methods that directly use the price of a garbage bag as an
explanatory variable, using Xi or X
0
i relaxes the assumption that the amount of discharged
waste strictly increases or decreases as the price of garbage bags increases.
We have to control for the timing of the introduction of unit-based pricing to estimate
the eect of the treatment precisely. For instance, introducing unit-based pricing at some
time near the end of the year would have little eect on the amount of waste discharged in
that year. To address problem, we consider a one-year lag of the treatment variable in our
estimation.
1410 Japanese yen is approximately equal to 9 US cents as of July 31, 2019.
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5 Estimation Results
5.1 The full model
Table 3 shows the results of the estimation with each treatment variable dened in Table 2.
The column titled \Treatment" denes the treatment used in each estimation. For instance,
the second row shows the estimation results of models with the treatment variable dened
as the treatment group cities where the price of a garbage bag is more than 0 yen but less
than or equal to 10 yen; other cities, excluding those that set the price of garbage bag as
more than 10 yen, are the control group. The second column titled \N of UBP" indicates
the number of cities that belong to the treatment group for at least one year between 2005
and 2015. The \FE" column shows the coecient of the treatment variable estimated using
a standard two-way linear xed eects model, ; the \WFE" column shows the estimation
results of the average treatment eect, DiD, as dened in (7), by the weighted xed eects
model. The numbers in parentheses are the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
////// Insert Table 3 around here //////
First, we focus on the results of the models with Xi. The results show that, in the case of
the two-way linear xed eects model, the sign of ATE is negative and statistically signicant
when the price per bag is higher than 30 yen. By contrast, in the weighted xed eects model,
the coecients are not statistically signicant in all cases. This result raises a question about
the eectiveness of unit-based pricing.
In the case of the models with Xi, large variation is observed in the number of treated
units among models, and this variation may aect the estimation results. In fact, the models
with X1 and X7 have only 6 and 11 treated units, respectively. Therefore, we focus on models
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with X 0i, which denes the treatment variable by dividing the price range per 20 yen, and the
variation between the number of treated unit among models is smaller than those with Xi.
However, even in this case, the results of weighted xed models with X 0i show that unit-based
pricing has no statistically signicant eect on the amount of waste discharge.
5.2 The case without prefectures hit by huge earthquakes
Two large earthquakes that occurred in Japan will cause inevitable bias in the results of our
analysis. One is Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake, which hit mainly Niigata prefecture in October,
2004. Although the earthquake occurred one year before 2005, which is the rst year of our
data, it signicantly aected the amount of waste discharge in 2005 and beyond. In fact, in
the case of Ojiya city, one of the most aected areas, the amount of waste discharge per capita
in 2005 is approximately ten times higher than the city-level national average in that year.
The other is the Great East Japan Earthquake, which hit eastern Japan in March, 2011. In
this case, in addition to the shaking, a tsunami caused by the earth quake inicted immense
damage on human lives and provoked great confusion in social infrastructure, such as waste
management systems.
These two earthquakes registered an intensity of 7, the maximum intensity, on the Japanese
scale of 0 to 715. To exclude the eects of these earthquakes, we redene the data. In partic-
ular, we remove the cities in Niigata prefecture to exclude the eect of the Niigata Chuetsu
Earthquake and those in three disaster-stricken prefectures, namely, Iwate prefecture, Miyagi
prefecture, and Fukushima prefecture, to exclude the eect of the Great East Japan Earth-
15Japan has experienced 4 earthquakes with a seismic intensity of 7 since 2000: Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake
in 2004, Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016, and Hokkaido Eastern Iburi
Earthquake in 2018.
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quake16. Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of ATE after excluding the data of cities
in the areas aected by the large earthquakes.
////// Insert Table 4 around here //////
The results of the models with Xi are the same as those in the case of the full data shown
in Table 3, except for the result of the WFE model with X8. Although not statistically
signicant at the 5% level, the result provides some evidence that unit-based pricing has a
negative eect on the amount of waste discharge when the price per bag is greater than 70
yen. In the case of models with X 0i, the results of the models with X
0
i estimated by the
weighted xed eects model show that the amount of waste discharge decreases when the
price per bag is suciently high (higher than 60 yen).
Residents may decide the amount of waste reduction by comparing the benet of waste
reduction, that is, avoiding the payment of the disposal fee, with the cost, such as the eort
required to reduce waste. Thus, if the price of a garbage bag is low, the cost of waste reduction
outweighs the benet and unit-based pricing does not aect the amount of waste discharge.
The above results also illustrate the dierence between the two estimation methods: the
two-way linear xed eects model and the weighted xed eects model. The two-way linear
xed eects model tends to overestimate the waste reduction eect of unit-based pricing
compared to the weighted xed eects model. In particular, the two-way linear xed eects
model indicates that unit-based pricing reduces the amount of waste discharge when the price
per bag is higher than 30 yen in the models with Xi and higher than 20 yen in the models with
X 0i. By contrast, the weighted xed eects model shows a reduction in the amount of waste
16The term \three disaster-stricken prefectures" is widely used in Japan to indicate the prefectures where
the number of deaths caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake exceeded 1,000.
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discharge only when the price per bag is higher than 60 yen. In addition, the magnitude of
the ATE estimated in the two-way linear xed eects model is far more excessive than that
in the weighted xed eects model. These results show that the assumption of linearity and
the denition of the counterfactual outcome used in the two-way linear xed eects model
aects the result of the estimation and may lead to ineective use of unit-based pricing.
////// Insert Figure 3 around here //////
The reason the weighted xed eects model has a tendency to yield smaller estimates
is worth considering. One of the main dierences between the two-way xed eects estima-
tor and the weighted xed eects estimator is the denition of the counterfactual outcome.
Specically, the former estimator uses the data of both treated and untreated observations
to calculate the counterfactual outcome of the treated unit, whereas the latter estimator uses
only the data of untreated observations. As shown by (3) and (9), the counterfactual out-
come calculated by the two-way xed eects model Y^ FEit (0) and the counterfactual outcome
calculated by the weighted xed eects model Y^it(0) both include three components. For the
purpose of explanation, we consider a situation where municipality i introduces unit-based
pricing at time t and compare the dierence in each component of the two estimators.
We begin by focusing on the rst component (i) in both (3) and (9). In the case of Y^it(0),
this component represents the amount of waste in municipality i in the period just before the
introduction of unit-based pricing, t  1. On the other hand, in the case of Y^ FEit (0), the rst
component is the average of municipality i's discharged waste for all periods except period
t during which the unit-based pricing policy is enforced by the municipality. If unit-based
pricing reduces the amount of discharged waste, then, in general, the amount of discharged
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waste in municipalities that have introduced unit-based pricing will be smaller than that in the
municipalities without this policy. Thus, if municipality i has maintained unit-based pricing
for a long time after time t, the number of observations (which is used in the calculation of
the rst component of Y^ FEit (0)) under the condition that unit-based pricing is conducted by
the municipality increases, and the rst component of Y^ FEit (0) will be smaller than that of
Y^it(0). Since the rst components of Y^
FE
it (0) and Y^it(0) have a positive eect on the total
value of Y^ FEit (0) and Y^it(0), the dierence in the denition of the rst component of each
counterfactual outcome will make the waste reduction eect of unit-based pricing estimated
by the two-way xed eects model much smaller than that estimated by the weighted xed
eects model.
Next, the second component of Y^it(0) is the average amount of discharged waste at time
t for municipalities that do not introduce unit-based pricing at time t or t  1. By contrast,
the second component of Y^ FEit (0) is the average amount of discharged waste at time t for all
municipalities except municipality i. If unit-based pricing reduces the amount of discharged
waste, the second component of Y^ FEit (0) will be smaller than that of Y^it(0) because Y^
FE
it (0)
uses the waste discharge data of municipalities with unit-based pricing when calculating the
counterfactual outcome. Since the second components of Y^ FEit (0) and Y^it(0) have a positive
eect on the total value of Y^ FEit (0) and Y^it(0), respectively, the dierence in the denition of
the second component of the counterfactual outcome will make Y^ FEit (0) smaller than Y^it(0).
Therefore, the waste reduction eect of unit-based pricing estimated by the two-way xed
eects model is much smaller than that estimated by the weighted xed eects model.
Finally, we consider the third component. In the case of Y^it(0), this component is the
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average amount of waste in period t   1 for all municipalities where unit-based pricing is
not introduced in either t   1 or t. By contrast, in the case of Y^ FEit (0), this component is
the average amount of waste discharge for all municipalities except for municipality i and
for all periods except for period t. The latter denition uses discharged waste data from
municipalities that introduced unit-based pricing, whereas the former estimator does not
include such data. Thus, if unit-based pricing reduces the amount of discharged waste, the
third component of Y^ FEit (0) will be smaller than that of Y^it(0). Since the third components of
Y^ FEit (0) and Y^it(0) have a negative eect on the total value of Y^
FE
it (0), the dierence in the
denition of the third component between the two estimators will make Y^ FEit (0) larger than
Y^it(0). Therefore, the waste reduction eect of unit-based pricing estimated by the two-way
xed eects model is much larger than that estimated by the weighted xed eects model.
In summary, the above discussion yields the following result:
Y^it(0)  Y^itFE(0) =
24Yit 1   1
T   1
X
t0 6=t
Yit0
35
| {z }
1st component (+)
+
24P(i0;t)2NDiDit Yi0t
#NDiDit
  1
N   1
X
i0 6=i
Yi0t
35
| {z }
2nd component (+)
 
24P(i0;t)2ADiDit Yi0t0
#ADiDit
  1
(T   1)(N   1)
X
i0 6=i
X
t0 6=t
Yi0t0
35
| {z }
3rd component (+)
< 0 (11)
Ultimately, the relative sizes of the estimates depend on the specic distribution of the
data. In our case, the eect that makes the two-way xed eects estimator larger than the
weighted xed eects estimator surpasses the opposing eect, so the latter estimator is larger
than the former.17
17The adjustment parameter, K, used in the calculation of the two-way xed eects estimator also aects
the relative size of the estimators.
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5.3 The eect on recyclables
Now, we examine the eect of unit-based pricing on recycling behavior. Tables 5 shows the
estimation results of the eect of unit-based pricing on the ratios of seven types of recyclables
per burnable waste (total recyclables, paper, metal, glass, PET bottles, plastics, and cloth)
with data excluding the cities in four disaster-stricken prefectures, as is the case with Table 4.
The numbers in parentheses are the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. By focusing
on the results of the weighted xed eects model, we can see that the implementation of
unit-based pricing has no eect on the ratios of metal, glass, PET bottles, plastics, and cloth;
however, a statistically signicant positive eect on paper recycling is observed. In fact, ATE
is positive and statistically signicant when the treatment variable is X 04. These cases show
that city residents increase their eorts to separate recyclable paper from burnable waste
when they are faced with a unit-based pricing system with a suciently high garbage bag
price. Since paper waste accounts for a substantial portion of the total amount of recyclables,
we also observe this trend in the case of the total amount of recyclables.
////// Insert Table 5 around here //////
This nding is consistent with results of the analysis of burnable waste: residents in
municipalities with suciently high garbage bag prices reduce their amount of burnable waste.
This result implies that city residents who face high disposal fees attempt to reduce waste
discharge by separating recyclable paper from burnable waste. Recycling activity puts some
burden on residents in terms of time and eort. Moreover, residents may have a propensity
to increase their eort to separate recyclables from waste when the benet of avoiding paying
disposal fees by reducing waste exceeds the cost of recycling. The benet of reducing waste
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increases as the price of municipality-designed garbage bags increases. Thus, residents in
a municipality with relatively expensive garbage bags increase their amount of recyclables
and reduce waste discharge, whereas residents in a municipality with relatively inexpensive
garbage bags do not exhibit such behavior.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we examined the causal eect of unit-based pricing policies using the weighted
xed eects model, which can provide more precise causal inference of the eect of the policy
even in the case of data from more than two periods and allows the linearity assumption
to be relaxed. The results of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the eect of
unit-based pricing is overestimated when we use the conventional linear xed eects model;
therefore, the analysis of the eect of unit-based pricing crucially depends on the assumption
of linearity and the denition of the counterfactual.
Although the estimated eect of unit-based pricing derived from the weighted xed eects
model is smaller than that from the two-way linear xed eects model, the result of the
weighted xed eects model implies that unit-based pricing reduces the amount of discharged
waste when the price is suciently high. Thus, unit-based pricing is eective for waste
reduction, but no eect of unit-based pricing is observed when the price is relatively low.
This nding suggests that there exists a threshold value for price, and the eect of unit-
based pricing appears only when the price exceeds the threshold. This value is dicult for
the model to determine using the price per garbage bag itself as a continuous explanatory
variable, which is common in previous studies on this topic.
We also examined the eect of unit-based pricing on the recycling rate for several re-
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cyclables and found that the policy may increase the recycling rate of paper but has no
signicant eect on other recyclables. According to these observations, the unit-based pricing
policy has some eect on promoting recycling, but the eect is limited.
Finally, we discuss the remaining issues requiring further study. The most important issue
is the applicability of the results. Because of data limitations, we focused on the eect of
unit-based pricing in the case of burnable waste. There are, of course, other types of waste,
such as incombustible waste. Thus, whether the results of the present paper hold in the
case of other types of waste must be examined. Additionally, the eect of the policy must
be investigated using data from countries other than Japan. Addressing these issues will
contribute to the design of more eective waste management policies.
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B Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Unit Mean S.D. Min Max N
Outcome variable
bwaste ton 0.23 0.05 0.09 2.32 8,195
rec % 7.58 7.35 0.00 42.91 8,195
paper % 7.00 6.75 0.00 38.62 8,195
metal % 0.18 0.51 0.00 17.44 8,195
glass % 0.13 0.44 0.00 15.55 8,195
PET % 0.02 0.11 0.00 1.58 8,195
pla % 0.01 0.08 0.00 2.43 8,195
cloth % 0.21 0.60 0.00 40.77 8,195
Price per bag
price yen 21.5 25.07 0.00 120 8,195
Time-variant confounder
dens number/ha 14.71 23.80 0.12 142.7 8,195
inc thousand yen 2,959 448 1,213 6,452 8,195
old ratio 0.25 0.05 0.10 0.49 8,195
family number 2.54 0.30 1.74 3.64 8,195
collec dummy 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 8,195
culti ha 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.83 8,195
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Table 2: Denition of treatment variables
Variable Denition of treatment Variable Denition of treatment
X1 0 < garbage bag price  10 X 01 0 < garbage bag price  20
X2 10 < garbage bag price  20 X 02 20 < garbage bag price  40
X3 20 < garbage bag price  30 X 03 40 < garbage bag price  60
X4 30 < garbage bag price  40 X 04 60 < garbage bag price
X5 40 < garbage bag price  50
X6 50 < garbage bag price  60
X7 60 < garbage bag price  70
X8 70 < garbage bag price
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Table 3: Estimation results: Burnable waste per person
Treatment N of UBP FE WFE
X1:(0; 10] 6 0.007 (0.024) -0.013 (0.04)
X2:(10; 20] 53 -0.031 (0.025) -0.021 (0.124)
X3:(20; 30] 95 -0.031 (0.017)
y -0.015 (0.011)
X4:(30; 40] 76 -0.052 (0.019)
 0.008 (0.019)
X5:(40; 50] 106 -0.092 (0.028)
 -0.009 (0.013)
X6:(50; 60] 28 -0.114 (0.037)
 -0.001 (0.012)
X7:(60; 70] 11 -0.120 (0.042)
 -0.082 (0.052)
X8:(70;1] 54 -0.103 (0.029)  -0.063 (0.038)
X 01:(0; 20] 59 -0.024 (0.021) -0.016 (0.023)
X 02:(20; 40] 171 -0.041 (0.013)  -0.002 (0.015)
X 03:(40; 60] 134 -0.094 (0.022)  -0.004 (0.013)
X 04:(60;1] 65 -0.107 (0.025)  -0.085 (0.066)
yp < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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Table 4: Results without areas aected by huge earthquakes
Treatment N of UBP FE WFE
X1:(0; 10] 6 0.011 (0.024) -0.011 (0.035)
X2:(10; 20] 52 -0.025 (0.024) -0.022 (0.126)
X3:(20; 30] 95 -0.028 (0.017) -0.016 (0.012)
X4:(30; 40] 73 -0.053 (0.019)
 0.011 (0.019)
X5:(40; 50] 92 -0.087 (0.025)
 -0.018 (0.016)
X6:(50; 60] 25 -0.113 (0.036)
 -0.003 (0.012)
X7:(60; 70] 9 -0.066 (0.026)
 -0.032 (0.097)
X8:(70;1] 54 -0.103 (0.029)  -0.068 (0.035) y
X 01:(0; 20] 59 -0.018 (0.021) -0.016 (0.024)
X 02:(20; 40] 166 -0.040 (0.013)  -0.001 (0.014)
X 03:(40; 60] 119 -0.093 (0.020)  0.002 (0.030)
X 04:(60;1] 62 -0.100 (0.027)  -0.066 (0.033) 
yp < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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